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THE SONG IS OVER BUT THE MELODY LINGERS ON:
PERSISTENCE OF GOODWILL AND THE INTENT
FACTOR IN TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Lanham Act' defines trademark abandonment as nonuse of a
trademark combined with "intent not to resume" use of that mark.2
Nonuse is determined fairly easily. For a trademark to be used under the
Lanham Act, it must be placed on the goods, the packaging for the
goods, or the displays associated with the goods,3 and the goods thereaf-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Lanham Act is the gov-
erning law on trademarks in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). Passed in 1946, it codified the common law of trademarks. See Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring). At common law, trademark protection originated as an action in deceit.
See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 5:2, at 133 (2d ed. 1984). In
testimony in support of the bill that was to become the Lanham Act, Professor Milton
Handler of Columbia University succinctly described the origin of the common law
trademark infringement action:
The ... difference between the trade-mark action and the ordinary action of
fraud and deceit was that in the ordinary action the plaintiff was the one who
relied upon misrepresentations to his damage. Whereas, in any action for trade-
mark infringement, the misrepresentation is made to the customer. The defend-
ant says, "This product of mine is made by Jones." That is what he means
when he puts Jones on his product, his name being Smith.
Now, the customer having relied upon this misrepresentation to his harm,
that would be the ordinary garden variety of fraud and deceit. The innovation
was that the competitor of Smith who had not relied upon the misrepresenta-
tion himself brought suit for the damage which resulted to him in the diversion
of his business, customers who wanted Jones' product were getting it from
Smith and he was losing sales.
Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 106 (1944). See generally J. McCarthy, supra, § 5:2, at 133-35; F. Schecter, The
Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks 122-145 (1925). In a sense,
the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case is the "vicarious avenger" of the public
interest. See Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 14
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
The Lanham Act also introduced certain innovations into the law of trademarks.
Thus, registration of a trademark under the Lanham Act is prima facie evidence of own-
ership of the mark and of the owner's exclusive right to use the mark. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(b) (1982). Further, the registration serves as constructive notice of a claim of
ownership so as to eliminate any defense of good faith adoption. See id. at § 1072. Fi-
nally, the Lanham Act incorporates the concept of incontestability, whereby, under cer-
tain conditions, registrations can become conclusive evidence of registrant's exclusive
right to use the mark. See i. at § 1065. Among other benefits, an incontestable registra-
tion cannot be attacked on the grounds of descriptiveness. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dol-
lar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). "A mark shall be deemed to be 'aban-
doned'-(a) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. Intent not to
resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years shall be
prima facie abandonment." Id.
3. See id. Under this definition, advertisement of goods, absent sale or shipment, is
not use. See In re Ancha Elec., Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1318, 1320 (T.T.A.B. 1986); In
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ter must be shipped or sold in interstate commerce. 4 The intent require-
ment of the definition, however, has given rise to considerable confusion
among the courts--confusion that has been exacerbated by disagree-
ment over the effect on the burden of proof of the Lanham Act's provi-
sion that "[n]onuse [of a mark] for two consecutive years shall be prima
facie abandonment." 6
Courts confronted with an abandonment question must decide three
issues: what is the weight of the ultimate burden of proof on the aban-
donment issue; what is the effect of the Lanham Act's rebuttable pre-
sumption of abandonment; and what must the trademark owner prove in
order to rebut the charge of abandonment.7
It is clear that the initial burden of proof in abandonment cases rests
on the party charging abandonment.' Courts disagree, however, on the
re International Paper Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424, 424-25 (T.T.A.B. 1967). A "dis-
play associated with the goods" generally includes material such as posters, shelf talkers,
window displays, or banners that are displayed near the goods at the point of sale. See
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 808.06, at 800-25 (7th rev. ed. 1986). The
term, however, has been interpreted more broadly. See In re Shipley Co., 230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 691, 693-94 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (use of mark on booth at trade show is a use on
display associated with the goods and not mere advertising). Note that there must be a
use in association with the goods. Thus, providing repair services for previously sold
goods is not use under the Lanham Act. See Kardex Sys. v. Sistemco N.V., 583 F. Supp.
803, 813 (D. Me. 1984).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Unlike patent law, see Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982);
see Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987), the Lanham Act does not preempt state
regulation of its subject matter, namely trademarks. See Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho,
646 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1980); Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F.
Supp. 1381, 1390-91 (D.N.J. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1986),
cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987). See generally United States Trademark Ass'n,
State Trademark and Unfair Competition Law (1988) (compilation and explication of
state trademark and unfair competition laws).
5. Compare Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1060 (2d Cir.) (finding no abandonment when trademark owner ceased use but retained
capacity to resume operations within a reasonable time under circumstances), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985) with AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1551 (11 th Cir.
1986) (finding trademark owner's renewal of registration in Patent and Trademark Office
insufficient to rebut presumption of abandonment), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987)
and Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing trademark owner must intend to resume active commercial use of mark after over two
year's nonuse, and token sales insufficient to rebut presumption of abandonment); see also
infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes 118-122 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See, e.g., E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525,
1532 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (2d
Cir. 1980); SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 843-45 (D. Or.
1987).
8. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 31 (1900); Conagra,
Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984); P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de
Beaute v. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A., 570 F.2d 328, 332-33 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
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weight of that burden. Most conclude that abandonment, being in the
nature of a forfeiture, must be strictly proved.9 Others, however, find
abandonment without requiring strict proof)10
It is also clear that the Lanham Act provision relating to prima facie
abandonment creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment when
the mark has not been used for over two years.'" Here too, however,
courts disagree on the effect of this rebuttable presumption. Some hold
that when the presumption is triggered, the burden of proof shifts to the
trademark owner to prove lack of abandonment-that is, to prove either
that he is using the mark, or that he intends to resume use. 2 Others take
the position that the rebuttable presumption of abandonment only shifts
the burden of going forward with the evidence. 3 Under this analysis,
once the presumption has been triggered, the burden shifts to the trade-
mark owner to produce some evidence rebutting the presumption of
abandonment.' 4 When this burden has been satisfied, however, the ulti-
mate burden of proof returns to the party charging abandonment. 5
Finally, there is the question of what the trademark owner must prove
to successfully defend against a charge of abandonment. This question,
of course, is intimately related to the burden of proof question. 16 Some
courts require that the trademark owner prove that he intends to resume
active commercial use of the mark." Others only require that the trade-
mark owner provide evidence of acts inconsistent with an intent to
9. See eg., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia
Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1981); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625
r.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts have continually used the phrase "strict proof"
without defining the meaning of "strict." The phrase was apparently first used in an early
hornbook. See W.H. Browne, A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks and Analogous
Subjects § 681, at 541 (1873). Presumably the proof must be strict because equity abhors
a forfeiture. Some courts speak of clear and convincing, rather than strict, proof. See
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Way Baking Co., 403 Mich. 479, 482, 270 N.W.2d 103, 105
(1978).
10. See e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1549-51 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d
96, 99-103 (5th Cir. 1983); see also infra note 86 and accompanying text.
11. See E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1532
(11th Cir. 1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (2d Cir.
1980).
12. See e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1549-51 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d
96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983).
13. See Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980);
SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Or. 1987).
14. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.
1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980);
SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Or. 1987).
15. See Star-Kist, 769 F.2d at 1396; Saratoga, 625 F.2d at 1044; SODIMA, 662 F.
Supp. at 845.
16. See SODIMA, 662 F. Supp. at 845.
17. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Hiland Potato Chip Co. v. Culbro Snack Foods, Inc., 720
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abandon. 18
Thus, there is little agreement among the courts as to how an abandon-
ment question should be answered.19 Most cases, however, involve a
common theme: they demonstrate the courts' consistent failure to ad-
dress whether goodwill in the allegedly abandoned trademark persists
even after use of the mark has ceased.2"
Persistence of goodwill in the context of an abandonment question
means that the public continues to recognize the mark as identifying a
particular product even after a period of nonuse.2 It is submitted that
when a trademark has persisting or residual goodwill, even after a period
of nonuse, doubts should be resolved in favor of the trademark owner
F.2d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695
F.2d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983).
18. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1060 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman,
625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 579
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
19. The basic question is at what point should abandonment be found. As one court
put it, it is not the law that "the slightest cessation of use causes a trade-mark to roll free,
like a fumbled football, so that it may be pounced upon by any alert opponent." Conti-
nental Distilling Corp. v. Old Charter Distillery Co., 188 F.2d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(footnote omitted). This is, of course, true, but it is likewise true that abandonment cases
often involve considerably more than "the slightest cessation of use." See, e.g., AmBrit,
Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550 (1 th Cir. 1986) (no use for almost 50 years), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (no use for 23 years). This kind of cessation of use, it is submitted, is definitely a
fumbled football. The only question is whether the whistle had blown on the play before
the fumble occurred.
20. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. McCarthy defines goodwill as "a
business value which reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business with
a seller who has offered goods and services which the customer likes and has found ade-
quate to fulfill his needs." J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:8, at 72. The existence of
goodwill in association with a trademark means that a significant proportion of the con-
suming public recognizes the mark, knows that the mark identifies a particular product,
and has favorable associations with the mark and confidence in the quality of the product
such that they will continue to purchase the trademarked product. See Premier Dental
Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 n.3 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 436 (1986).
Goodwill is important in other contexts as well. Thus, a trademark cannot be assigned
apart from the underlying goodwill represented by the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060
(1982). An assignment without goodwill is called an assignment in gross and invalidates
the assignment. See Premier Dental, 794 F.2d at 853; Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927,
929 (2d Cir. 1984); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 260-61 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
21. See Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1060
(2d Cir.) ("[G]oodwill does not ordinarily disappear or completely lose its value over-
night. Erosion from non-use is a gradual process."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985);
Sterling Brewers, Inc. v. Schenley Indus., 441 F.2d 675, 679 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (brewer's
willingness to pay considerable sum for rights to mark, even after nonuse for over eight
years, evidences that reservoir of good will remains); American Motors Corp. v. Action-
Age, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 377-79 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (finding continuing reservoir
of goodwill where mark RAMBLER discontinued on new automobiles, but RAMBLER
parts and accessories continued to be supplied to owners of old vehicles).
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and against the competitor charging abandonment.' Further, the three
questions set forth above should be answered in a way that makes it as
difficult as possible to find a trademark abandoned whenever goodwill in
the mark persists.23
This approach takes into consideration the policies underlying the
Lanham Act and protection of trademarks in general,24 which lead to the
conclusion that the public interest in not being deceived by confusingly
similar trademarks is the most important policy.' This overriding goal
can be advanced only by giving the strongest possible protection to trade-
marks that have persisting goodwill, even if the trademark in question
has not been used for a period of time.26
Part I of this Note develops the necessary analytical framework for
discussing a trademark abandonment question. Part II sets forth the pol-
icy considerations underlying the protection of trademarks and argues
that the most important is that of protecting the public's interest in not
being confused by similar marks. Part III outlines the preferred ap-
proach for analyzing an abandonment problem and demonstrates the
ways in which the actual responses of the courts are inadequate in light
of the most important principle underlying the Lanham Act-protecting
the public from confusion.
I. THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT
A trademark "includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods ... and distinguish them from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source
is unknown."27 In the United States, unlike many foreign countries,
rights in a trademark accrue through use2' of the mark rather than
through the fact of registration.29 Furthermore, once a trademark is reg-
22. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text; see also J. McCarthy, supra note 1,
§ 17:6, at 105 (Supp. 1987).
23. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text; see eg., Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v.
Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575,
579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
24. For a discussion of these policies, see infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
25. See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986);
In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985); infra notes
44-48 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
29. Section 1 of the Lanham Act provides that: "[t]he owner of a trade-mark used in
commerce may register his trade-mark under this [Act]. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982)
(emphasis added). In most other countries of the world, an applicant for registration
need not have used his trademark prior to filing the application. See generally Trade-
marks Throughout the World 951-54 (A. Jacobs 4th ed. 1987) (providing tables setting
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istered, it must continue to be used."° Otherwise, the courts or the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office may cancel the registration on the grounds of
abandonment.3 '
Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides that a mark shall be deemed
abandoned when "its use has been discontinued with intent not to re-
sume."3' 2 As noted previously, courts disagree on how to define "intent
not to resume."
3 3
This statutory threat of cancellation, and the abandonment question in
general, constitute matters of great practical significance for trademark
owners whose portfolios include trademarks that have not been used for
many years.3 4 If, on the one hand, the owner must prove intent to re-
forth countries in which first registrant acquires exclusive rights in mark, and countries in
which first user of a mark is entitled to registration).
Even in countries that nominally are "use" countries in that the first user is entitled to
registration, an application for registration may be lodged on the basis of proposed, rather
than actual, use. This is true of the United Kingdom, see Trade Marks Act of 1938, 1 & 2
Geo. 6, ch. 22, Canada, see Trade Marks Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. T-10 (1970), and Brit-
ish law countries in general. See A E. Horwitz, World Trademark Law and Practice,
CAN-i--CAN-110 (1982) (law of Canada); B E. Horwitz, World Trademark Law and
Practice, UK-1-UK-170 (1982) (law of United Kingdom). In Canada, the application
may be based on proposed use, but the registration will not issue until the mark actually
has been used and a declaration attesting to such use has been filed. See McMahon,
Canadian Trademark Law A Bridge Between United States and Foreign Law, 4 Suffolk
Transnational L.J. 251, 258 (1980); Murrow, The Concept of "Use" Under Canadian
Trademark Law, 65 Trademark Rep. 223, 225 (1975). Section 44 of the Lanham Act
contains an exception to the general requirement of actual use by providing for so-called
convention applications based on applications in a foreign country by a foreign national
"whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks...
to which the United States is also a party." 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1982). The foreign
applicant need not have used the mark anywhere in the world prior to filing of the United
States application. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909 (T.T.A.B. 1984). Apart from this exception, though, a trade-
mark must be used in commerce in (or with) the United States before an application for
registration may be filed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (definitions of
"commerce" and "use in commerce").
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059, 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Corporate Fitness
Programs Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1688
(T.T.A.B. 1987) (token use for purposes of registration must be followed by activities that
show intent to place product on market on a commercial scale); Sinclair v. Deb Chem.
Proprietaries Ltd., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161, 164 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (registrant must use
mark within two years after registration).
31. The Lanham Act provides that trademark registrations may be cancelled-that
is, struck from the register-for a number of specified reasons, including abandonment.
See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. International Mobile Machs. Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q.
1024, 1025 (BNA) (T.T.A.B. 1983); 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Further-
more, proof of abandonment is a complete defense to a charge of infringement. See 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2) (1982); Kardex Sys. v. Sistemco N.V., 583 F. Supp. 803, 811-13 (D.
Me. 1984); Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 987 (S.D.
Ala. 1979).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
34. Cf AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550 (11th Cir. 1986) (no use of
mark for almost 50 years, but trademark owner resisted claim of abandonment), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1008 [Vol. 56
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sume active commercial use, then many of those reserve trademarks may
be of limited value because they are vulnerable to a petition for cancella-
tion on the basis of abandonment.35 If, on the other hand, actual intent
to abandon must be shown, then the owner is relatively safe because
there are many acts that arguably are inconsistent with an intent to
abandon.36
This dispute over the definition of intent in the context of abandon-
ment cannot be resolved by reference to the statutory language, which is
susceptible to at least two interpretations, 37 nor by reference to the legis-
lative history, which is inconclusive at best.38 Accordingly, courts must
consider the policies underlying the protection of trademarks in general
and the Lanham Act in particular.39 Such an analysis would evaluate the
relative importance of the policies and then ask how the various ap-
1987) (no use for 23 years, but trademark owner resisted attempt by Silverman to use
mark).
35. See, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495
F.2d 1265, 1273-74 (2d Cir. 1974) (89 bottles of perfume sold in 20 years; abandonment
found); Lipton Indus. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (two
shipments in ten years; abandonment found).
36. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In
Silverman, the defendant, CBS, owned all copyright and trademark rights in the AMOS
'N' ANDY characters of radio and television fame. Id. at 576. The AMOS 'N' ANDY
television program had been withdrawn from television syndication in 1964 and had not
been aired since then. Id. In defending against a charge of abandonment, CBS pointed
out that it had licensed certain uses of the property for educational and historical pur-
poses, it at 576-77, that it had renewed copyrights in the radio and TV programs, id. at
577, that it had policed infringing uses of the mark, id., and that it periodically reconsid-
ered the question whether the time was ripe to resume full commercial use. Id. at 577.
All of these acts were found to be inconsistent with an intent to abandon and, thus,
despite CBS's admission that it had no present plans to resume use, the court held that
there was no abandonment. Id. at 581; see also Rick v. Buchansky, 609 F. Supp. 1522,
1540 (S.D.N.Y.) (plaintiff's "tenacity" in pursuing infringement claims disproves aban-
donment), appeal dismissed, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985). But see AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft,
Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986) (renewal of registration for mark POLAR B'AR in
Patent and Trademark Office insufficient to prove intent to resume use), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1983 (1987).
The owner also can defend by arguing "excusable nonuse." Thus, the statute provides
that a trademark registration must be renewed every 20 years and that the application for
renewal must allege that the mark "is still in use in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1982).
If the mark is not in use, however, renewal still can be effected if the owner shows that
the "nonuse is due to special circumstances which excuse such nonuse and... is not due
to any intention to abandon the mark." Id. This concept of excusable nonuse appears in
the legislative history. See Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1944). There it is defined to require "circumstances
beyond the control of the registrant" such as war or Prohibition. Id. (testimony of Mr.
Fenning); see also Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d
1053, 1060 (2d Cir.) (going out of business), cert denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Stock Pot
Restaurant, Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc., 737 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same); Chandon
Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 535 (2d Cir. 1964) (forced
wartime withdrawal from American market; no abandonment); Olympia Brewing Co. v.
Northwest Brewing Co., 178 Wash. 533, 35 P.2d 104, 107 (1934) (Prohibition).
37. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
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proaches of the courts would advance or retard these policies.40
II. PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS THE MOST
IMPORTANT POLICY UNDERLYING TRADEMARK
PROTECTION
Three major policy factors underlie the protection of trademarks: the
public interest in not being deceived as to the source or origin of goods,
the trademark owner's proprietary interest in the goodwill created by the
mark, and the competitor's interest in being free to use a mark that has
been abandoned.41 Most authorities cite the protection of consumers and
the securing of the owner's interest in his mark as the two most impor-
tant policy goals of the Lanham Act.42 Considerable authority exists,
however, for the proposition that protecting the public interest forms the
single most important policy factor in trademark law.43
A. The Public Interest
The Senate Report of the Lanham Act declares that the first policy
40. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
41. See J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:1, at 44-51. The latter policy of protecting the
competitor's interest is arguably of minor significance. See infra notes 69-72 and accom-
panying text.
42. The Senate Report of the Lanham Act set forth the basic purposes of trademark
legislation as follows:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for
and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv.
1274; see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985);
Ameritech Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir.
1987); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
43. Professor McCarthy has noted that likelihood of confusion is the "keystone" of
the law of trademarks and unfair competition. See J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 2:3, at
54. Courts have consistently sounded this theme that protection of the public from con-
fusion as to the source of goods is the paramount concern of trademark law. Thus in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1960), the
court noted that defendant's actions created a "deceptive situation giving rise to the like-
lihood of confusion in the public mind. That this may tend to harm plaintiff is properly
to be considered. However, the paramount concern of the courts is the protection of the
public interest." Id. at 900. Likewise in James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc.,
540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976), Chief Judge Markey stated that in a trademark infringe-
ment action the court must consider more than the interests of the two parties involved.
"A third party, the consuming public, is present and its interests are paramount. Hence
infringement is found when the evidence indicates a likelihood of confusion, deception or
mistake on the part of the consuming public." Id. at 274. See also Blau Plumbing, Inc. v.
S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Sardi's Restaurant Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d
719, 723 (9th Cir. 1985); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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goal of the bill is protection of the public.' The goal, then, is to prevent
consumers from being deceived as to the source or origin of goods.45 Put
more positively, the goal is to lower the consumers' search costs by mak-
ing it easy and convenient for them to find the particular product they
are looking for."
The Lanham Act accomplishes these goals by outlawing the use of a
trademark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive."'47 Thus, in ruling on a trademark infringement matter, a court
must decide whether consumers, on seeing defendant's mark, would be
likely to believe that the defendant's enterprise is in some way related to,
connected with, affiliated with, or sponsored by the plaintiff."a
B. Trademark Owner's Interest Must Not Prevail
Over the Public's Interest
The policy factor of protecting the trademark owner's interest in the
trademark as a property right also holds considerable importance.4 9 The
Supreme Court has noted that a trademark owner seeks to "impregnate
the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol."50 Once this has been accomplished, the trademark owner has
something of value." The owner's interest, however, must not be al-
lowed to become more important than the public's interest.2 Otherwise,
44. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274.
45. See Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 (5th
Cir. 1984); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 300-01 (9th
Cir. 1979) (quoting HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974));
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976).
46. The court in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985), stated:
The purpose is to reduce the cost of information to consumers by making it easy
for them to identify the products or producers with which they have had either
good experiences, so that they want to keep buying the product ... or bad
experiences, so that they want to avoid the product....
Id. at 338; see Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir.
1986). See generally Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & Econ. 265, 269 (1987) (general discussion of economic rationale of trademark
protection). For those who are intimidated by equations and economic jargon, a more
readable version of the Landes-Posner article has been published in The Trademark Re-
porter. See Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep.
267 (1988).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1982).
48. Se4 e.g., Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.
1987); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983);
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
49. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1274.
50. Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205.
51. Id
52. See General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp. 359, 362 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (BETTY COOKER'S CROCK BOOK FOR DRUNKS with picture of Morey
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trademark law would resemble copyright law, 3 thus destroying the bal-
ance Congress sought to achieve in granting the various monopolies asso-
ciated with intellectual property rights."
The universe of intellectual property rights is very carefully structured
so that the power of the monopoly granted exists in inverse proportion to
its temporal extent. For example, the strongest monopoly, the patent,
has the shortest life span-seventeen yearss5 -because the patent monop-
oly gives the holder the right to bar anyone from making, using or selling
the patented invention. 6 The copyright monopoly, which allows the au-
thor to bar another from making copies of the copyrighted work,57 has a
greater life span-life of the author plus fifty years.58 The monopoly is
limited, however. If another party independently creates the work,5 9 or
creates the work using sources other than the copyrighted work,6" then
Amsterdam pouring booze over salad held not confusingly similar with BETTY
CROCKER mark).
53. The governing law on copyrights in the United States is the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra notes 55-63 and accompa-
nying text. There is, of course, a public interest associated with copyright law, namely
the interest in dissemination of the copyrighted work. See Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Serv., 751 F.2d 501, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1984). When this interest con-
flicts with the interest of the copyright owner in reaping the benefits of his labor, how-
ever, the latter usually prevails. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (public interest in details of President Ford's autobiography does not
justify copyright infringement).
54. "Monopoly" is a loaded term and perhaps gives a misleading impression when
used in association with the law of intellectual property. A trademark, for example, is
probably not a monopoly in any proper sense. See infra note 62. On the other hand, the
Constitution speaks of the "exclusive Right" of patents and copyrights. U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. Also the Senate Report of the Lanham Act notes that trademarks are not
"monopolistic grants" like patents and copyrights. See S. Rep. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
3-4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1275.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). The governing law on patents in the United States is
found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The 17-year term applies to utility
patents, which cover any "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Id. at § 101. Design patents,
which cover "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture," id.
at § 171, have a term of 14 years. See id. at § 173.
56. Id. at § 271; see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) ("pat-
ent law operates 'against the world,' forbidding any use of the invention for whatever
purpose for a significant length of time"); Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp.
664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) ("[I]nfringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional
and without knowledge of the patent. In this respect the law of patents is entirely differ-
ent from the law of copyright."); see also Bernstein, Is a Plant Patent a Form of Copy-
right?, 27 Idea 31, 31-32 (1986) (exploring differences between patent and copyright law).
57. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (1982).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). Copyright in anonymous and pseudonymous
works and works made for hire endures for a term of 75 years from the year of first
publication or 100 years from the year of creation, whichever expires first. See id. at
§ 302(e).
59. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 1984); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902-03 (1931).
60. See Selle, 741 F.2d at 904; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,
54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); see also Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co.,
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there is no infringement.6" Finally, the least extensive monopoly is the
trademark,62 which has a potentially infinite life span.63
A trademark owner may enforce his trademark against use by another
of a mark that is likely to confuse or deceive the public." If there is no
likelihood of confusion, the owner may not bar the use, even of an identi-
cal trademark, by another.61 Congress' adoption of the likelihood of con-
fusion standard in this context manifests the policy of protecting the
public interest.66 If the trademark owner's interest were to dominate
over that of protecting the public, then trademark law would become
indistinguishable from copyright law.67 The trademark owner would ob-
tain all the benefits of copyright law, such as the right to bar use by
others irrespective of whether the public is confused, without the corre-
spondingly limited life span of the copyright. 68
113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) ("simple, trite themes... are likely to recur spontaneously
... and [only few] ... suit the infantile demands of the popular ear").
61. See Selle, 741 F.2d at 905-06; Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,
558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
62. Some would say it is not a monopoly at all. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918) ("The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the
proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a
monopoly."); see also S. Rep. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274-75 (trademarks are not "monopolistic grants" like patents
and copyrights). On the other hand it has been recognized that "[tlrademark law...
confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion." K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. CL 950, 957 (1988); see also Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of
Wheat Co., 224 F. 566, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (a trademark is a "lawful monopoly"; the
trademark owner "has the monopoly of a creator, something which is not and never has
been within the prohibition of any law.. ."). See generally R. Callmann, The Law of
Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies § 4.53 (4th ed. 1981) (general discus-
sion of trademark monopoly's interface with antitrust laws).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1982) (renewal of trademark registration can be effected
every 20 years).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979).
65. See Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. tLG. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beef-
eater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976).
66. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
67. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3819 (U.S. May 17, 1988) (No. 87-1908); Boston
Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010-11
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co.,
421 F. Supp. 359, 362 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
68. See supra notes 57-58. The problem also arises in connection with state laws
prohibiting trademark "dilution." Typically, these laws do not require that the trade-
mark owner prove likelihood of confusion, see, e g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330
(West 1987); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110B, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1985); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
§ 368-d (McKinney 1984). The rationale of the dilution laws is to prevent the whittling
away of the distinctive quality of famous trademarks by a" 'cancer-like growth of dissim-
ilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established dis-
tinctive trade-mark or name.'" Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624
(2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 538, 543, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (1977)). The problem is
that having done away with the likelihood of confusion requirement, the dilution laws
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C. Protection of the Competitor's Interest Is Only a Corollary Policy
The competitor's interest in using a mark occupies the place of a
stepchild in the policy factor family. The Lanham Act's legislative his-
tory does not mention this factor except to the extent that it may be
inferred from the emphasis given to the competition-stimulating function
of trademarks.69 Also, a few courts have mentioned this policy in the
context of "encouraging competition from which the public benefits" 70 or
in terms of discouraging the token use or "warehousing" of trade-
marks.7 ' It is, however, generally not considered to be one of the pri-
potentially greatly expand the protection afforded the trademark owner. See Shire, Dilu-
tion Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law
of Infringement?, 77 Trademark Rep. 273 (1987) (criticizing on policy grounds this ex-
tension of protection).
A variation of the problem arises in the trademark parody case, where someone takes a
well-known trademark and uses it to make a satiric or political point. In such a case,
little danger of public confusion exists. But to the extent that the trademark is considered
a property right, the courts may be disposed to protect it against a satiric use. See Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (defendant barred from
selling MUTANT OF OMAHA T-shirts to dramatize his concerns about nuclear war),
petition for cerL filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3819 (U.S. May 17, 1988) (No. 87-1908).
69. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1274-75. Professor Handler, in discussing the bill that was eventually
to become the Lanham Act, cautioned that:
[P]rotection [for the trademark owner] must not be so good that it goes beyond
protecting the public against fraud, goes beyond providing effective and efficient
protection to the plaintiff and infringes upon the privilege of American traders
in the traditional free American enterprise to enter a field and compete on a
parity with those already in the field.
Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
106-07 (1944).
70. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
71. See National Color Laboratories, Inc. v. Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002,
1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (referring to "the interest of others in not being restrained from
free use of trade names because of mere token use on the part of one"). The policy is also
illustrated, at least by implication, in those cases disapproving of warehousing of marks.
Warehousing or banking may be defined as the attempt to reserve trademarks for use at
some unspecified time in the future. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550
(1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Explora-
tion Co., 695 F.2d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983). Typically, warehousing occurs at the begin-
ning of the trademark cycle, when the applicant decides that he likes a number of marks,
makes token uses of the marks, and then files applications based on those token uses. See,
e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. On-Cor Frozen Foods, Inc., 746 F.2d 801, 804-05 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015, 1016-17
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968). Token use at this stage is perfectly proper.
See Corporate Fitness Programs Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1682, 1688 (T.T.A.B. 1987). Subsequent to registration, the mark is either not
used or minimally used, sometimes in what is called a "trademark maintenance" pro-
gram. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1204-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980). Since these marks possess little or
no goodwill, it is fairly easy to find abandonment despite the minimal use. See Lipton
Indus. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (finding abandon-
ment where registration over 10 years old supported by only two shipments, one for
application, one for declaration of use); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v.
Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1272-73 (2d Cir. 1974) (89 bottles of perfume in 20
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mary policies of trademark law. 2
III. ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL ABANDONMENT PROBLEM
A. Policies as Outcome Determinative
A review of the policies underlying the protection of trademarks sug-
gests that, at least in theory, the adoption of one policy or another as
favored could be outcome-determinative of an abandonment problem.
Thus, exclusive application of the policy factor of protecting the public
from confusion would lead to the protection only of marks that have
persisting goodwill- 3 if the goodwill of a mark has disappeared, the
mark no longer is associated in the public's mind with the owner's goods
or services, and therefore no possibility of fraud or deception exists.7 4
Thus, if the courts consider the protection of the public to be the most
important policy, then they will concentrate, in Professor McCarthy's
words, on the "market place perception of the consumers" ' and protect
a trademark with residual goodwill, even after a period of nonuse. 6
Conversely, solely applying the policy of protecting the owner's inter-
est to the abandonment question would lead to absolute protection of
trademarks against a claim of abandonment, whether or not the mark
has persisting or residual goodwill and whether or not a possibility of
public confusion exists.77
years-a "meager trickle"); Procter & Gamble Co., 485 F. Supp. at 1204-07 (finding
P&G's "minor brands" program, involving minimal yearly shipments, insufficient to cre-
ate enforceable trademark rights); see generally, Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 281 (1987) (noting that "banking" of trade-
marks in Japan makes it more costly to enter the market there); Fletcher, "Time Out, "
"Snob," "Wipe Out" and "Chicken of the Sea" The Death Knell of "Token Use'?, 65
Trademark Rep. 336 (1975) (general discussion of token use). The disapproval of token
use also extends to what are called "sham" uses, which are purely defensive uses of a
mark designed to prevent others from using the mark. See Intrawest Fin. Corp. v. West-
era Nat'l Bank, 610 F. Supp. 950, 958 (D. Colo. 1985).
72. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
73. See Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059
(2d Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Manhattan Indus. Inc. v. Sweater Bee by
Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1980); Pan Am. World Airways v. Panamerican
School of Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir.
1986).
74. See Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1059; Pan American, 648 F. Supp. at 1031.
75. As Professor McCarthy stated:
In the author's opinion, it is error to emphasize the non-user's intent over the
market place perception of customers. While both aspects are relevant, where
the firm claims lack of intent to abandon, the primary emphasis should be on
the degree to which customers still recognize the mark, for it is this which will
result in a likelihood of confusion.
J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 17:6, at 105 (Supp. 1987).
76. See, eg., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1060 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman,
625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980).
77. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.) (while finding for plaintiff despite absence of public confu-
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Last, to the extent that the procompetition policy is viable it obviously
cuts in the direction of finding against the trademark owner and in favor
of the competitor charging abandonment.78 Courts adhering to this
procompetition policy will claim that their holdings strictly enforce the
letter of the Lanham Act.7 9
B. The Correct Approach
Most cases dealing with abandonment problems do not present the
kinds of difficulties that this Note has been exploring. Thus, when use of
a mark has been de minimis, 80 or when the owner has been unable to
make up his mind what to do with a mark and, as a result, has failed to
exploit the mark commercially," then the decision to find abandonment
is fairly easy because no goodwill associated with the mark can exist and
thus no possibility of public confusion arises.8 2 The more difficult case,
however, is the one arising in the following hypothetical.
Assume that Company A has not used a trademark for over two years,
but that the public still recognizes the mark as denoting a single source.
In other words, the rebuttable presumption of abandonment has been
triggered, but the mark has persisting goodwill. Assume further that
Company A has no present plans to resume use of the mark, but it does
not wish to abandon the property. Company B affixes a confusingly simi-
lar mark to related goods and, when charged with infringement by Com-
pany A, defends on the grounds of abandonment.
Courts first should recognize that failure to protect a trademark in this
situation-where there is persisting goodwill in the mark-inevitably will
lead to public confusion. 3 Given that the public still recognizes the
sion, court admitted that this may tilt trademark laws "from the purpose of protecting
the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs"), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
868 (1975); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (mark AMOS
'N' ANDY protected without discussion of whether goodwill in mark persisted).
78. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 101 (5th Cir.
1983) ("The [Lanham] Act does not allow the preservation of a mark solely to prevent its
use by others.").
79. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550-51 (1lth Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d
96, 101 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. See Avakoff v. Southern Pac. Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1985); La So-
ciete Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir.
1974).
81. See SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 852 (D. Or. 1987);
La Maur v. International Pharmaceutical Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612, 617 (T.T.A.B.
1978).
82. See Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A.
1982); Jean Patou, 495 F.2d at 1272; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc.,
485 F. Supp. 1185, 1204-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
205 (2d Cir. 1979); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274
(7th Cir. 1976); Kingsmen v. K-Tel Int'l Ltd., 557 F. Supp. 178, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Thus, in Dallas Cowboys, the actresses in the "gross and revolting sex film," Debbie Does
Dallas, wore (at least some of the time) costumes similar to those worn by plaintiff's
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mark as denoting a single source, use of the mark by Company B will
lead people to believe that B's related goods are manufactured, licensed
or endorsed by Company A.4 Because protection of the public interest
in not being deceived serves as the most important policy underlying the
protection of trademarks,85 the courts should approach the subject as
suggested in this Note.
First, the burden of ultimate persuasion at all times should be on the
competitor to prove abandonment through clear and convincing evi-
dence.86 Second, when the rebuttable presumption of abandonment has
been triggered, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to
the trademark owner, who then must provide some evidence rebutting
the presumption.87 Once this burden has been satisfied, however, the
party charging abandonment should reassume the burden of ultimate
persuasion.88
Finally, when goodwill is proven to exist, the courts ought to be flexi-
ble on the question of how much evidence is required to rebut the pre-
sumption of abandonment.8 9 The amount of evidence required should be
inversely proportional to the amount of persisting goodwill left in the
mark.90 Thus, when the evidence of goodwill is weak, the court should
demand strong evidence of intent to resume use, such as plans for full-
cheerleaders. 640 F.2d at 202-03. The public in this situation might be confused into
believing that plaintiff had sponsored the movie, or licensed defendant, or was in some
other way connected with the production. Id. at 205.
84. See supra note 83.
85. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
86. See J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 17:3(B), at 772; see also Citibank, N.A. v. Ci-
tibanc Group, 724 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984) (strict burden of proof applicable to
abandonment claims); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156
(9th Cir. 1982) (abandonment, being in the nature of a forfeiture, must be strictly
proved), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Oland's Breweries [1971] Ltd. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488 (T.T.A.B.) (requiring evidence "that leaves
no room for doubt or speculation" leading "to but one inescapable conclusion"), aff'd,
548 F.2d 349 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Way Baking Co., 403 Mich.
479, 482, 270 N.W.2d 103, 105 (1978) (to prove abandonment, defendant must show by
clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff had ceased use of mark), cerL denied, 444
U.S. 869 (1979).
87. See SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Or. 1987);
Poncy v. Johnson & Johnson, 460 F. Supp. 795, 803 (D.N.J. 1978).
88. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.
1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980);
SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Or. 1987).
89. Even in jurisdictions like the Fifth Circuit that seem more disposed towards find-
ing abandonment, this flexibility may exist in practice, if not in theory. Thus, in Exxon
Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit re-
manded to the district court for findings on the question of intent to resume use. Id. at
104. The district court, on the basis of some rather thin evidence of token shipments and
marketing department proposals, ultimately did find that Exxon had the requisite intent
to resume use. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 592 F. Supp. 1226, 1230
(N.D. Tex. 1984).
90. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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scale resumption of commercial exploitation in the immediate future.9
Conversely, where strong evidence of goodwill is presented, the courts
may accept a lesser quantum of evidence, such as proof of acts inconsis-
tent with an intent to abandon.92
C. Courts' Failure to Consider Goodwill Has Resulted in Confusion
and Contravenes Basic Purpose of Lanham Act
An examination of existing case law reveals that courts have by and
large rendered decisions that address the two lesser policy goals of the
Lanham Act-protection of the trademark owner's property interest,
93
and that of the competitor.94 Analysis of these cases will reveal that the
approach advocated in this Note is superior.
1. The Overly-Protective Forfeiture Theory
Many courts speak of abandonment as being in the nature of a forfei-
ture and thus a matter to be strictly proved by the party charging aban-
donment. 95 Although these cases seem, for the most part, to adopt the
correct approach on burden-shifting 96 and thus often reach the intui-
tively correct result, their analysis is flawed for one of two reasons.
Either they give little or no consideration to the question of the existence
of persisting goodwill,97 or they assume the existence of goodwill on the
91. See, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495
F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1974); SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839,
849 (D. Or. 1987). In SODIMA, the owner of the trademark registered his mark on the
basis of a token shipment but thereafter delayed commercial exploitation for several years
while trying to make up his mind what kind of product to apply the mark to. Id. at 851-
52. The court did not allow this kind of hoarding. See id. at 852.
92. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1060-61 (2d Cir.) (holding plans for resumption of business within short time after cessa-
tion of use sufficient), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 575, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding renewal of copyrights, policing of infringements,
licensing educational uses, and periodically reconsidering revival of TV series all inconsis-
tent with intent to abandon); Kingsmen v. K-Tel Int'l Ltd., 557 F. Supp. 178, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding continued receipt of royalties for old records sufficient).
93. See Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1060
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575,
579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
94. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96,
100-02 (5th Cir. 1983).
95. See Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1060
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625
F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir 1980); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); see also supra note 9.
96. See Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980);
SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 844 (D. Or. 1987).
97. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 666 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Silverman the
court referred in a footnote to the "continued public recognition of AMOS 'N' ANDY."
Id. at 580 n.6. There was, however, no specific finding that the mark had persisting
goodwill. Id. at 581.
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basis of circumstantial evidence. 98
This represents a critical lapse, because if goodwill does not exist, there
is little likelihood of public confusion.9 9 Without public confusion, there
is no public interest in protecting the allegedly abandoned mark.o0 The
trademark then can be preserved, if at all, only on a theory of protecting
the owner's property interest, which then must be balanced against the
competitor's interest.' As previously noted, the danger in tilting the
scales in favor of the trademark owner in a situation like this is that
doing so would convert trademark law into copyright law, thus upsetting
the carefully crafted balance of intellectual property rights. 02
2. The Overly Restrictive Plain Meaning Argument
Other courts adhere to what is perceived as the literal language of the
statute and insist that the only question is whether the trademark owner
has plans to resume commercial use of the mark.0 3 If he does not, these
98. In Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985), for example, the court found that the existence of
goodwill "may well be evidenced" by defendant's offer to pay $10,000 for rights to plain-
tiff's mark and by the defendant's later misappropriation of the mark. Id. at 1061. The
court did not demand other independent proof of the existence of goodwill. See id; see
also Sterling Brewers, Inc. v. Schenley Indus., 441 F.2d 675, 679 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (finding
goodwill to exist because of brewer's willingness to pay considerable sum for rights to
mark).
99. See Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Pan Am. World Airways v. Panamerican
School of Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1160
(2d Cir. 1987). In Pan American, the plaintiff airline sought to prevent the defendant
travel agent school from using the designation PANAMERICAN. Id at 1029. Plaintiff
conceded that it did not currently use the mark PAN AMERICAN to identify its opera-
tions but claimed that it had used the mark for many years and thus enjoyed sufficient
residual goodwill. Id. at 1031. Plaintiff's argument failed, however, because of insuffi-
cient evidence that it was known to the public as Pan American (as opposed to Pan Am).
Id
100. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
101. Note in this connection Professor Handler's warning that:
[Trademark] protection must not be so good that it goes beyond protecting the
public against fraud, goes beyond providing effective and efficient protection to
the plaintiff and infringes upon the privilege of American traders in the tradi-
tional free American enterprise to enter a field and compete on a parity with
those already in the field.
Hearings on H.P, 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 106-07 (1944).
102. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text; see also Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp.
359, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1976); cf Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th
Cir. 1987) (finding satirical use of "MUTANT OF OMAHA" to be infringement of MU-
TUAL OF OMAHA mark based on rather weak evidence of public confusion over dis-
sent's argument that holding violates defendant's first amendment rights), petition for
cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3819 (U.S. May 17, 1988) (No. 87-1908).
103. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1550 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987); Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 101-
02 (5th Cir. 1983).
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courts will find abandonment whether or not this will lead to confusion
of the public."° In actuality, such courts seem to be manipulating the
language of the Act in order to promote the policy of protecting the com-
petitor's interest.10 5
The opinion in Exxon v. Humble Exploration Co., 106 for example, pays
lip service to the public interest policy, 0 7 and then focuses on the com-
petitor's interest.108 In effect, the antiwarehousing language' 0 9 of Exxon
translates into a procompetitor policy rationale. This ignoring of the
public interest factor, however, would be justified only if the Exxon court
were correct in saying that it is compelled by the plain meaning of the
statute.
Recall that the precise statutory language is "intent not to resume"
use.110 The Exxon decision makes much of the supposed distinction be-
tween intent to abandon, I"' which is, of course, harder to prove and thus
favors the trademark owner, and intent not to resume use." 2 A review
of the legislative history, however, suggests that, at least from the point
of view of the framers of the Lanham Act, no such distinction exists." 13
104. See Exxon, 695 F.2d at 101-02.
105. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
106. 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. 695 F.2d at 101 (protecting a mark that has residual goodwill "may be good
policy").
108. See id. ("The [Lanham] Act does not allow the preservation of a mark solely to
prevent its use by others.").
109. See id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
111. 695 F.2d at 102.
112. See Exxon, 695 F.2d at 102-03 ("An 'intent to resume' requires the trademark
owner to have plans to resume commercial use of the mark. Stopping at an 'intent not to
abandon' tolerates an owner's protecting a mark with neither commercial use nor plans
to resume commercial use.").
113. The legislative history suggests that the "intent not to resume" use language was
adopted from the common law. Thus, Daphne Robert, representing the American Bar
Association, in discussing the definition of abandonment during hearings on the Lanham
Act, quoted the relevant language from the proposed bill and then said: "[tihat, of
course, is present law." Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1944).
Pre-Lanham Act cases often used "intent not to abandon" and "intent to resume use"
interchangeably. For example, in Gold Seal Assoc. v. Gold Seal Assoc., 56 F.2d 452
(S.D.N.Y. 1932), the court stated:
Here no intent on the plaintiff's part to abandon its business forever was made
to appear. It had been forced by lack of funds to suspend the active prosecution
of the business, and such suspension had continued for about a year. But the
proof already referred to shows convincingly that honest efforts were being
made all along to revive the plaintiff and to resume the business.... It cannot
be said that the company had thrown away its name and whatever good will
still clung to it.
Id. at 453; see Recamier Mfg. Co. v. Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc., 59 F.2d 802, 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1932).
Indeed, this interchangeability was dramatically illustrated in an early version of what
was to become the Lanham Act, H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), which defined
abandonment as follows: "A trade-mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned'--(a) When
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The Exxon court nevertheless rejected the idea that intent not to re-
sume use is interchangeable with intent to abandon on the theory that
"an owner may not wish to abandon its mark but may have no intent to
resume its use." 14 When an owner seeks to retain a mark only to pre-
vent its use by others, the court held "the statutory language is criti-
cal.' 115 In that situation, the trademark owner must have "plans to
resume commercial use of the mark."' " 6 Other courts, however, con-
tinue to use the intent to abandon language." 7
The Exxon court goes on to discuss the rebuttable presumption of
abandonment. The argument the court makes is that where the rebutta-
ble presumption has been triggered, the burden of persuasion should shift
to the trademark owner, who must then prove the converse of "no intent
to resume use," namely intent to resume use."1 As has been noted previ-
ously, however, other courts reject this analysis of the effect of the rebut-
table presumption." 9 These courts find that only the burden of going
forward with the evidence shifts; 20 the burden of persuasion remains at
all times with the party charging abandonment.' 2' In fact, it would ap-
pear that this analysis is more consistent with Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presump-
tion, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon
the party on whom it was originally cast.1
2
its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. Intent to abandon may be in-
ferred from circumstances." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). A mere three months later, an
amended bill, H.R. 6618, 76th Cong., 1st Sess, (1939), was introduced. There, the defini-
tion of abandonment read as follows: "A mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned'-(a)
When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. Intent not to resume may
be inferred from circumstances." Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The change apparently
was suggested by one Chauncey P. Carter, a Washington practitioner, see Hearings on
H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1939), but the reasons for the change were not otherwise discussed.
114. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. Id
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 216 (4th Cir.) ("To prove
abandonment, a party must show intent to abandon."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982);
United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[The]
twin requirement of non-use and intent to abandon is embodied in... the statutory
definition of abandonment.").
118. Exxon, 695 F.2d at 102.
119. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.
1985); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980);
SODIMA v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Or. 1987).
120. See Star-Kist, 769 F.2d at 1396; Saratoga Vichy, 625 F.2d at 1044; SODIMA, 662
F. Supp. at 845.
121. See SODIMA, 662 F. Supp. at 845.
122. Fed. R. Evid. 301; see Poncy v. Johnson & Johnson, 460 F. Supp. 795, 803
(D.NJ. 1978). The solution to the presumption problem embodied in Rule 301 is that of
Professor Thayer. In contrast, Professor Morgan would shift both the burden of coming
1988] 1021
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the Exxon rule demands not just use, but active commer-
cial use.12 3 This gloss on the word "use" offers additional proof that the
plain meaning argument does not flow solely from the language of the
statute. Rather, the plain meaning argument depends on how one inter-
prets the law of presumptions and how one construes the word "use" in
the statute.
Last, even if the Exxon court were correct in its assertion that the
plain meaning of the statute compels a particular result, it is an accepted
principle of statutory construction that so-called plain meaning should
not control where that meaning would lead to a result contrary to the
overall purpose of the statute. 24 And because the Exxon result is at
odds with the preferred policy of protecting the public interest, courts
should reject it.
CONCLUSION
Intentional abandonment of a trademark under the Lanham Act con-
sists of nonuse plus intent not to resume use. Courts have struggled with
the definition of this intent factor. The proper approach is first to con-
sider whether there is persisting goodwill in the trademark and thereafter
to adopt a flexible definition of intent depending on the amount of good-
will proved to exist in the trademark. This interpretation of the intent
element advances the most important policy of the Lanham Act, namely
the protection of the public from confusion, and, at the same time, does
not do violence to the language of the statute.
Stanley A. Bowker, Jr.
forward with the evidence and the burden of ultimate persuasion, which is, of course,
exactly what the Fifth Circuit incorrectly did in Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co.,
695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence, 1 300[01] (1986) (discussion of Thayer/Morgan controversy on the effect of
presumptions).
123. Exxon, 695 F.2d at 102.
124. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) ("It is a 'familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' ") (quoting Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). Weber held that title VII
of the Civil Rights Act does not prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans de-
spite the fact that such plans in effect discriminate against whites in seeming contraven-
tion of the so-called plain meaning of the statute.
[Vol. 561022
